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Recent advances in the examination of efficiency gains from dynamic
tax reforms have used simulation models to isolate intragenerational
and/or intergenerational effects. Important considerations having to do
with uncertainty or capital market imperfections are frequently missing
from such a framework.In this paper, we focus on the welfare gains
from introducing social security retirement annuities, given lifetime
uncertainty and borrowing restrictions.
Our principal findings are four. First, given the considerations
mentioned above, "precautionary saving" exceeds life—cycle saving (that
would have taken place in the absence of lifetime uncertainty), lending
further support to the notion that the perfect—certainty version of the
life—cycle model provides an inadequate explanation of observed saving
behavior. Second, the introduction of an actuarially fair social
security system leads to a significant partial equilibrium increase in
lifetime consumption and welfare, accompanied by a reduction in the
capital stock.The increase in lifetime welfare is reduced, however,
and in many cases eliminated, when borrowing restrictions are imposed.
Third, extending the model to general equilibrium, we find that the
partial equilibrium gains in lifetime welfare from participation in
social security are offset by the interaction of higher steady—state
interest rates and binding liquidity constraints.Finally, replacing
the proportional payroll tax with a progressive tax (essentially a
linear tax with an exemption), we show that age—specific tax schemes can
restore much of the potential gain from introducing social security.
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It has been recognized for some time in applied public economics
that discussion of the impact of taxation and public programs on
individual welfare (as well as on such aggregate measures of interest as
the saving rate or the capital stock) requires an explicit analysis of
agents' intertemporal budget constraints.1Recent advances in the
examination of efficiency gains from dynamic tax reforms have used
simulation models to isolate Intragenerational and/or intergenerational
effects.2 Analytical techniques have also been used to examine marginal
tax changes (see for example Judd, 1985).
Two important considerations are missing from such a framework.
First, most of these exercises have assumed perfect certainty.Many
government programs, most notably social insurance programs, affect
agents' lifetime budget constraints to the extent that the private
insurance markets (against uncertainty over length of life, job loss,
catastrophic illness, etc.) are incomplete. It is possible to think of
the "event—conditioned" transfer programs that comprise social insurance
as relaxing constraints on individual consumption. For example, one of
the primary goals of the social security retirement program is the
maintenance of consumption in old age.Outside of social security,
Hamermesh (1982) discusses the role of unemployment insurance in
removing liquidity constraints on recipients during unemployment. When
social insurance is viewed in the framework of precautionary saving, its
provision will in general affect lifetime consumption, and not just
consumption during the periods in which payments are received.In this
paper, we focus on social security retirement annuities both because—2—
of their importance in the existing literature on tests of the life—
cycle model and because of the way in which they are financed.
Since the pioneering paper by Feldstein (1974), studies have
examined the impact of social security over the life cycle and not just
in old age. Empirical work has tested the impact on consumption of the
individual wealth transfers accompanying the introduction of a pay—as—
you—go social security system.3 Extending this discussion of the impact
of social security on pre—retirement consumption, some recent studies4
have shown in the context of lifetime uncertainty that even an
actuarially fair, fully funded social security system can raise lifetime
welfare. Hence previous partial equilibrium estimates of the impact of
social security on consumption drawn solely from the consideration of
the intergenerational wealth transfers at the introduction of the system
may even be too small.
Second, the specification of a 1ifetie budget constraint may be
too narrow a description of restrictions on individuals' optimizing
behavior in the presence of capital market imperfections.Actual
limitations on borrowing appear in upward sloping interest rate
schedules, collateral requirements, and quantity restrictions. Hayashi
(1982) found that approximately twenty percent of all consumption in the
U.S. is accounted for by liquidity—constrained consumers.Flavin
(1984) found that the estimate of the marginal propensity to consume is
affected dramatically by the inclusion of proxies for liquidity
constraints, suggesting that liquidity constraints are an important part
of the observed excess sensitivity of consumption to current income.5
We find that the presence of liquidity constraints reduces substantially
the welfare gains from introducing social security annuities.—3—
These two qualifications are certainly related.The extent to
which agents can spread the benefits fromparticipation in social
security annuities over their lifetimes depends on the degree to which
capital markets permit Consumption—smoothing when currentresources are
insufficient. More important, since socialsecurity is financed through
a proportional payroll tax on current earnings, payroll taxesdepress
consumption dollar for dollar when liquidity constraints arebinding.
Including realistic limitations on borrowing introduces thepossibility
that increasing the provision of social securitycoverage (financed by
the payroll tax) may leave individuals worse off interms of utility
gained from lifetime consumption, while at the same timeincreasing
potential lifetime resources.In general, one expects that an optimal
tax structure should reallocate this burden overan individual's
lifetime.
Our approach suggests an extended view of analyzing theimpact of
social insurance programs and tax reform on lifetimeconsumption in the
presence of restrictions on private trades.Such a framework will
facilitate analysis of fiscal policy changes onsteady—state levels of
individual welfare and national saving, andmay permit reconciliation of
observed individual saving behavior with that predictedby the life—
cycle model.
We organize our analysis of the importance ofcapital—market
imperfections (market failure in the private provision of annuities and
borrowing restrictions) in describing the impact of social securityon
individual welfare and the capital stock as follows.In section II, we
investigate the relevance of borrowing restrictions and uncertaintyover
longevity for the size of the capital stock.In particular, we find—4—
that the stock of "precautionary saving" far exceeds the size of the
capital stock accounted for by the life—cycle model in the absence of
lifetime uncertainty, corroborating recent findings by others that the
perfect—certainty version of the life—cycle model cannot explain
observed saving behavior.
In section III, we take up the partial equilibrium effects on
individual consumption.For any plausible set of assumptions about
underlying parameters, social security generates a significant increase
in lifetime consumption and welfare accompanied by a reduction in the
capital stock if borrowing restrictions are absent. The partial
equilibrium increase in individual welfare is reduced, and in some cases
eliminated, when borrowing restrictions are imposed.The substantial
difference suggests the importance of reexamining the proportional
payroll tax finance of social security.
In section IV, we extend the model to general equilibrium, with
endogenous factor prices. Partial equilibrium gains in lifetime welfare
from participation in social security are offset by the interaction of
higher steady—state interest rates and binding liquidity constraints.
The steady—state welfare cost of social security under proportional
payroll tax finance is in general substantial.Section V Illustrates
the ability of alternative proposals for financing social security to
alleviate the problem created by the interaction of borrowing
constraints and the proportional payroll tax. Age—specific tax schemes
can restore much of the potential gain from participating in social
security annuities.
Conclusions and directions for future research are discussed in
section VI.—5—
II.LIFETIME UNCERTAINTY, BORROWING RESTRICTIONS, AN]) INDIVIDUAL
SAVING BEHAVIOR
Ouremphasis in this paper is on lifetime uncertainty and social
security, though many of the results are applicable to other types of
uncertainty and social insurance. Consideration of the impact of
uncertain longevity on "precautionary" saving has figured prominently in
analyses of consumption. Yaari's (1965) seminal paper showed that with
an uncertain lifetime, intertemporal utility maximization can dictate
saving for the probability of living longer than expected. More recent
applications to public pension schemes have appeared in Davies (1981),
Sheshinski and Weiss (1981), Abel (1983), and Hubbard (1983, 1984b).
Before considering social security per Se, we begin by analyzing
the potential contribution of "uncertainty saving" (here against
variable longevity) to the size of the capital stock. That contribution
could be an important part of the explanation for the finding by
Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) that pure "life—cycle" wealth is dwarfed by
the stock of wealth from intergenerational transfers in accounting for
the capital stock. Their analysis —conductedin a certainty model —
seemsto imply that planned bequests are an important motive for
individual saving.6 To the extent that precautionary saving is
significant, however, modifying the basic life—cycle model to include
uncertainty may account for much of the failure of the basic life—cycle
model to explain observed wealth—age profiles (particularly among the
aged).
Such precautionary saving is necessary because of market failure in
the private provision of old—age annuities.This market failure is
likely because of asymmetries of information between individuals and
insurers, the classic adverse selection problem discussed by Rothschild—6--
and Stiglitz (1976) and elaborated in the context of social security by
Ecksteln, Eichenbauni, and Peled (1985). Friedman and Warshawsky (1985)
show that under plausible assumptions about risk aversion, the returns
on life annuity contracts actually offered in the market would not be
purchased by optimizing individuals.7
In this study, we do not explicitly model the reason for the
absence of annuity markets.We assume that they simply exist neither
prior to nor after the introduction of the social security system. This
is an appropriate assumption given our focus on the importance of the
interaction of liquidity constraints and the social security system. By
ruling out all annuities, we make the impact unrealistically large,
biasing the results in favor of social security.If we were to add
reasonable features such as overpriced annuities, manipulative bequest
motives (Bernheim, Schleifer, and Summers, 1984), or altruistic bequest
motives, the value of social security annuities would decline. The
importance of liquidity constraints would not be affected, however,
Implying that our negative results would be more likely to hold.
In this section, we derive consumption—age and wealth—age profiles
given lifetime uncertainty, and contrast the resulting size of the
capital stock with that from a similar model in which lifetime is
certain.Consider the following life—cycle model. Agents are assumed
to be selfish, in that no bequests are desired. Individuals live for a
maximum of T years, working only for the first R years; the retirement
age of R is taken as exogenous, and labor is supplied inelastically.
The probability of surviving through period t is Pt for each t.Our
simulations begin at the beginning of individuals' working lives—7
(assumed to be age twenty).Retirement occurs at model age forty—
five. The maximum model age to which one can survive is ninety.
Following Yaari (1965) and Barro and Friedman (1977), we let
utility be additively separable across periods, and let utility from
consumption U(C) be evaluated contingent on being alive at time t.




(2) =w+ rA +3 —C,A(0)=0,A(T)0,
where C,p, and r represent consumption and the (constant) subjective
discount rate and interest rate, respectively. A represents the stock
of accumulated assets.A dot over a variable denotes a time rate of
change.The income stream w represents labor earnings;B includes
resources from unplanned bequests from the previous generation.8
Assuming that the utility function is of the isoelastic form, we
can rewrite (1) as
(3) max 1T --pC l+e_Ptdt,
C 0
whereis the coefficient of relative risk aversion.Note that if
h(t)dt is the probability of death during (t, t+dt), the hazard rate,
the problem becomes—8—
_1T (p+h(s))ds
(4) max ---Je 0 Cdt.
0
subject to (2). Denoting the marginal utility of consumption
conditional on being alive by A and the sum of the rate of time
preference and the hazard rate reflecting lifetime uncertainty by p
the differential equations describing the time paths of consumption and




together with the boundary conditions A(0) =ACT)=0.
Within the framework of the model described above, we can simulate
the effect of lifetime uncertainty on the size of the capital stock.
The total capital stock is aggregated up from age—specific individual
asset stocks assuming a population growth rate of one percent per
annum.Individuals in the certain—lifetime case are assumed to die at
the average age of death in the population.Data on average survival
probabilities are taken from Faber (1982). The individual age—earnings
profile is taken from Davies (1981). The rate of time preference p is
assumed to equal 0.015. 10
There Is some evidence on the value of in the literature. In
their study of household portfolio allocation, Friend and Blume (1975)
estimated the coefficient of relative risk aversion to be in excess of
2.0. Farber's (1978) estimation of preferences of United Mine Workers
from collective bargaining agreements yielded estimates of the—9—
bt4wetm
coefficientof relative risk aversion ofA3.O and 3.7.Hansen and
Singleton (1983) found estimates of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion between 0 and 2.0.In our simulation exercises, we use four
values of 13(—.9, —2, —4, and —6) along with three alternative values of
r (.02, .04, and .06).
Bequests are incorporated in the simulations as follows.Using
information °'Ptover the life cycle, a distribution of initial
bequests can be generated. We consIder intergenerational transfers from
a generation of single "parents" to the next generation.Iteration
proceeds for a given set of parameter values until an individual would
transmit (in expected present value) the same bequest he receives. As
our principal concern is with the first—order effects of lifetime
uncertainty (and later social security) on the aggregate capital stock
(and hence output and consumption), we do not discuss the impact of
lifetime uncertainty or social security on the steady—state distribution
of bequests (e.g., Abel, 1983).Given our emphasis on life—cycle
patterns of consumption and savings, it is important that we do not
aggregate intertemporally.We must allow the individual to live for
several periods if we are to get a quantitative idea of the importance
of liquidity constraints. We use a year as our unit of time; we shall
see that a year is large enough that any substantially greater unit
would involve too much aggregation. However, given this fineness in our
intertemporal consumption patterns, it would be numerically intractable
to calculate a steady—state rational expectations distribution of
bequests. Therefore, all individuals are assumed to receive the
weighted—average bequest regardless of their particular family mortality
history. The implicit assumption is that individual bequests are taxed— 10—
awayby the government and redistributed lump—sum to individuals. To
model the observation that these bequests are most likely to occur when
the recipient is in early middle age, such receipts are assumed to be
obtained after twenty periods.'1
Table 1 below illustrates the importance of lifetime uncertainty
for the size of the capital stock by reporting values for the aggregate
savings—income ratio (K/Y) In the certain—lifetime and uncertain—
lifetime cases, the ratio of the capital stocks in the two cases, and
the value of average unplanned bequests as a fraction of lifetime
earnings.The simulation results in Table 1 illustrate clearly the
significance of uncertainty over longevity for explaining the stock of
savings. For all assumptions about the interest rate or the coefficient
of relative risk aversion, unplanned bequests accompanying lifetime
uncertainty are significant relative to lifetime earnings, and capital—
Income ratios are substantially higher in the uncertain—lifetime case.
Aggregate capital stocks implied by the life—cycle model with certain
longevity are small relative to those implied by the uncertain—lifetime
case under similar assumptions; for example, the ratio of the former to
the latter is 0.22 for the plausible case wherein r =.02and
=—2.The unrealistically low K/Y ratios in the certain—lifetime case
lend further support to the finding in Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) that
the basic life—cycle model can explain only a small portion of the
aggregate capital stock. Our finding of the importance of precautionary
saving could help to explain this discrepancy without relying on
intentional bequest motives.
An additional critique of standard life—cycle models is that
borrowing restrictions inhibit the ability of individuals to carry out— 11—
theiroptimal age—consumption profile. One such limitation —andthe
one which we employ in our work —isa collateral restriction, so that
net worth must be nonnegative at all times. That this restriction is
most likely to be binding for the young implies that consumption will be
shifted to later in life for the representative individual, and the
aggregate capital stock will be larger than it would have been if
capital markets were not subject to this restriction.
The ImposItIon of a borrowing restriction of this form requires
motivation. Here we rely on observed collateral requirements for
borrowing in U.S. capital markets, i.e., the restricted access to
"consumption loans." Institutional motivations for the constraint
Include legal restrictions prohibiting the inclusion of human capital as
an asset In bankruptcy proceedings or, also for our purposes, the
assignment of future social security benefits. Allowing individuals to
borrow some fixed "small" amount would increase significantly the
numerical complexity of the problem, without qualitatively altering the
results.Taken together, our assumptions about market failure in the
private provision of annuities and borrowing restrictions should
Introduce no bias a priori, since the former magnifies the potential
impact of social security on lifetime welfare, and the latter reduces
It.
When we impose the constraint that net worth must be nonnegative at
all times, we substantially change the nature of the consumer's
optimization problem. The budget constraint in (2) becomes
(2') A =w+rA +B—C,A(t) 0, for all t.— 12—
Thefirst—order conditions must be altered to take into account this
state constraint (see Kamien and Schwartz, 1982, for a discussion of
such problems). The new arbitrage equations become
(A =(p—r)A,ifA > 0 or A > U'(w)
(5a')
"A =U'(w), if A =0and AU'(w )
A=0,ifA =0and fB(s)dsis continuous at t,
0
(5b')
8_i A =w+ rA + B —A ,otherwise.
If assets are positive or if wages exceed consumption, then (5a)
still holds.Otherwise, consumption is limited to current earnings.
This divides the consumer's problem into constrained and unconstrained
periods of time. (5b') governs how these intervals meet. At the moment
when A0 becomes binding, it imposes the tangency relation between A
and the constraint.
Tables 2 and 3 point up the additional relevance of liquidity
constraints for the size of the capital stock in the certain—lifetime
and uncertain—lifetime cases, respectively.In each table, we report
the number of periods in youth during which the constraint is binding,
the value of the aggregate capital—income ratio (K/Y) in the
unconstrained and constrained cases, and the loss in individual lifetime
welfare expressed as a percentage of lifetime earnings (Li). In all
cases, the aggregate capital—income ratio is higher in the constrained
regime, and individual welfare costs due to the constraints are— 13—
substantial(particularly for risk—averse individuals). Table 4
summarizes the combined effect of lifetime uncertainty and borrowing
constraints on the size of the capital stock.
III.UNCERTAINTY LIFETIMES AND SOCIALSECURITY: INDIVIDUAL WELFARE
AND THE CAPITAL STOCK
Social Security and Individual Saving Behavior
Inan earlier paper, Hubbard (1984b) showed that public provision
c a,-.,, ,1-14 (
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to partial equilibrium increases in individual welfare and national
saving.A brief outline of such a social security system follows.
Individuals are compelled to pay a payroll tax t on gross wages, from
which the social security system is funded.During retirement they
receive an annuity benefit S in each period t until death.The asset
accumulation constraint (in the absence of borrowing restrictions)
becomes
(6) A =rA+w+B+S—C,A(T)=0.
Ifbenefits are set according to a replacement rate of the terminal
wage, then the economy—wide actuarially fair benefit S satisfies the
condition that
(7) sfTp e rtd = jR pwertdt.
R 0
Hubbard (1984b) shows that, in the absence of borrowing restrictions,
the system generates an increase in the propensity to consume out of— 14—
lifetimeresources. This increase in lifetime consumption occurs even
in a system which is actuarially fair and fully funded.
In Table 5 below, we simulate the partial equilibrium impact on
initial participants of the imposition of an actuarially fair social
security system financed by a proportional payroll tax of six
percent.12 Percentage changes in the capital—output ratio and average
bequests as a fraction of lifetime earnings are reported, as is the
change in lifetime welfare (expressed in terms of a percentage change in
initial lifetime earnings). Two features of the results in Table 5 are
noteworthy. First, the system generates very large initial declines in
the capital stock. Given the dramatic reduction in the size of
accidental bequests shown in the table, this is not surprising.'3
Second, potential welfare gains to initial participants from introducing
an actuarially fair social security system are significant for plausible
parameter values.
Liquidity Constraints and the Partial Equilibrium Gains from Social
Security
Of course, much of the partial equilibrium welfare gain from the
introduction of social security comes about because of increases in pre—
retirement consumption made possible by the annuity provisions. With a
nonnegativity constraint on net worth, however, the social security
payroll tax depresses pre—retirement consumption as long as the
constraint binds, and increases consumption after the constraint ceases
to bind. Hence the effect of an actuarially fair social security system
is to increase desired consumption of the young, while decreasing actual— 15—
consumptiondue to the interaction of the payroll tax and restrictions
on borrowing.
The extent to which social security depresses pre—retirement
consumption depends in part on the importance of bequests. Even in the
absence of an explicit bequest motive, given uncertainty over longevity,
transfers at death will be positive on average.Inheritances play two
roles with respect to liquidity constraints. The larger is the
anticipated bequest, the greater is desired consumption in each period
of life.On the other hand, received inheritances also improve the
ability to pay for current consumption.
The imposition of borrowing restrictions mitigates the effects of
social security on individual lifetime consumption and the aggregate
capital stock noted earlier.Because the system is financed by a
proportional payroll tax on earnings, forced saving occurs in youth. In
the simulation exercises reported in Table 6 that follows, we illustrate
the impact of the introduction of social security on the aggregate
capital stock, average bequests relative to lifetime earnings, and
individual lifetime welfare.The numbers in the last set of columns
represent the gains in lifetime welfare from participating in social
security expressed as a percentage of lifetime earnings. As before, the
simulations are conducted over four values ofand three values of r.
In all cases, the social security payroll tax is set equal to six
percent;the system is by construction actuarially fair and fully
funded.
The first set of columns in Table 6 illustrates the importance of
the restriction on borrowing against future net earnings for consumption
even under a moderate social security tax with consumption constrained— 16—
tobe no more than current resources for at least 10 periods at an
interest rate of .02.For modest risk aversion (= —2),the gains in
lifetime welfare reported for this case in Table 6 are substantially
smaller than the potential gains in the absence of borrowing
restrictions. For greater risk aversion,=—4,the gains are trivial
when the interest rate is .02, and at interest rates of .04 or .06, the
operation of the social security system actually leads to a
loss in lifetime welfare, as it does for all cases when=—6.These
results suggest the importance of both uncertainty and the method used
to finance the system in explaining the impact of social security on
individual saving behavior. Before returning to the issue of financing
the system in section V, we take up in section IV the problem of
considering these effects when factor prices are endogeous.
IV. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUN,STEADY—STATE IMPACTSOFSOCIAL SECURITY
ON INDIVIDUAL WELFARE AND TilE CAPITAL STOCK
To examine seriously the welfare effects of social security under
differentassumptions about capital market imperfections, we must
analyze the new steady state after the system is introduced. Changes in
the steady—state capital stock will affect the level of output and
consumption per head, and hence the lifetime utility of a representative
agent. Members of the first generation in the system benefit both from
the increase in lifetime resources from the uninsured previous
generation andthe gains from participating in social security
annuities.14 The reduced value of accidental bequests permits smaller
gains in consumption for succeeding generations. Hence, to consider the
potential welfare gains from compulsory pensions, the tradeoff between— 17—
thebenefits to early participants and the costs of a lower capital
stock to subsequent generations must be examined.
The partial equilibrium effects of social security on individual
saving will be dampened in a general equilibrium analysis of the impact
on aggregate capital formation, once factor price changes are taken into
account. Such considerations have been examined in the certainty
models.For example, Kotlikoff (1979a) used a life—cycle model with
certain longevity and a Cobb—Douglas production technology to consider
the impact of a pay—as—you—go social security system on the capital
stock. For plausible parameter values, he found that the positive
lifetime wealth increment traceable to social security caused a twenty—
percent decrease in the steady—state capital stock.While this effect
is certainly substantial, it is roughly half of his calculated partial
equilibrium effect which is directly related to the excess of the
present value of benefits over the present value of contributions.
To examine the impact of savings against lifetime uncertainty on
aggregate saving we assume that output is produced according to a Cobb—
Douglas production function in capital and labor, with a capital share
equal to cz. Factor markets are assumed to be competitive, so that
capital and labor are paid their marginal products.That is, the
interest rate (r) and base wage rate (w) are such that:
(8) r =czkal,and
(9)w =(1a)ka,
where k represents the capital—labor ratio.— 18—
Withinthis framework, the steady state can be solved for as
follows.A guess is made for k.Solutions for r and w are then
generated from the marginal productivity conditions to produce
individual consumption and wealth profiles.The resulting aggregate
consumption and capital stock in intensive form are compared with the
initial guess, and iteration proceeds until convergence is reached.
As In the partial equilibrium case, a second calculation of the
value of the steady—state bequest must also be made. Within the routine
described above, each parameterization of r and w generates a different
expected bequest, which Is then transferred to the child.
We pursue our analysis of the general equilibrium impact of social
security on the capital stock and individual welfare in four steps in
Table 7.In all cases, c is assumed to equal 0.3, and p= 0.015.
First, we compute the Initial steady—state values of the interest rate,
capital—output ratio, average bequest relative to lifetime earnings, and
lifetime welfare in the absence of social security for each of the four
values of . Thoseresults are reported in the northwest corner of
Table 7.As expected, higher levels of risk aversion are associated
with higher average bequests and capital stocks, and hence lower steady—
state interest rates.
Introducing actuarially fair social security financed by a
proportional payroll tax of six percent in the northeast corner of Table
7, the interest rate and initial bequest are held constant from the
original no—social—security steady state.As the third column shows,
average bequests are reduced substantially, as the initial generation to
participate In social security obtains the dual benefits of a high
initial bequest and access to social security annuities. Partial— 19—
equilibriumwelfare gains are recorded for the =—.9and =—2cases.
The added burden of payroll contributions to social security during
youth causes welfare losses for the two higher measures of risk aversion
(=—4,=—6). Moving to the southwest corner, the interest rate is
still fixed at its initial steady—state level, but a new steady—state
bequest is computed. The capital stock and lifetime welfare continue to
decline relative to their counterparts in the no—social—security steady
state.
Finally, in the southeast corner of Table 7, the new steady state
is computed. As expected from the substantial reduction in bequests and
the capital stock, steady—state interest rates increase considerably.
The interaction of the higher interest rates and lower earnings with the
contribution of payroll taxes to binding liquidity constraints leads to
significant reductions in lifetime welfare. For example, in the =—.9
case, a 3.8 percent partial equilibrium increase in lifetime welfare
becomes a 14.7 percent reduction in the new steady state.
We do not mean to imply that these calculations represent an
accurate description of the historical impact of social security on the
capital stock in the U.S.Participants in social security have, for
example, obtained returns much greater than the actuarially fair
return.The assumption of complete market failure in the private
provision of annuities leads to a large effect on desired lifetime
consumption from the introduction of social security annuities. While
the annuity market in the U.S. is very imperfect, it is not nonexistent;
Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak (1983) point family risk—sharing
arrangements, and Hubbard (1984a) identifies the importance of private
pensions as annuity substitutes.Constraints due to the proportional
payroll tax finance are, however, unaffected by this qualification. In— 20—
thenext section, we illustrate the importance of liquidity constraints
for these impacts by examining an alternative financing method.
V.PROGRESSIVE TAXATION ANDTHE WELFARE GAINS FROM SOCIAL SECURITY
To examine more carefully the influence of the method of financing
social security on its impact on the capital stock and individual
welfare, we now remove the assumption of proportional payroll tax
finance. In its place we institute a progressive social security tax in
which the first fifteen working periods are exempt from payroll
taxation. To preserve comparability with our previous results, the
retirement benefit is kept the same as under the proportional tax case
where t= .06.A new, higher flat tax rate is instituted in the
sixteenth period to maintain the average actuarial fairness of the
system. The use of an exemption (effectively, an "earned income
credit") alleviates the added contribution to the social security
payroll tax to liquidity constraints on consumption.By shifting the
burden of the tax intertemporally through higher taxes later in life,
the same present value of contributions can be collected with an
increase in individual lifetime utility from consumption.15Cross—
sectionally, the use of the exemption corresponds to progressive
taxation.
Partial equilibrium results for the impact of social security on
lifetime welfare (comparable to Table 6) are presented in Table 8.
Simulations are run over four values ofand three values of r as
before.The top entry in each cell represents the gain in lifetime— 21—
welfare(expressed as an equivalent percentage of lifetime earnings)
from participating in the "progressive—tax—financed" social security
system.The numbers in parentheses below are the corresponding gains
from the "proportional—tax—financed" system in Table 6.Gains are
positive in all cases in Table 8, and for many parameterizations are
substantially higher than in the proportional—tax—financed case. We are
exploring these results further in extensions allowing for elastic labor
supply. That age—specific tax schemes can restore much of the potential
gain from participating in social security puts in a new light claims
based on "perfect markets" models that large welfare costs necessarily
accompany progressive taxation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
One of the original goals of the social security old—age benefit
program was the maintenance of consumption in retirement. Over the past
decade, however, many theoretical and empirical studies have focused on
the impact on pre—retirement consumption of the provision of social
security annuities.For example, with uncertainty over longevity and
imperfections in private annuity markets, the introduction of even an
actuarially fair social security system can generate a substantial
increase in lifetime consumption and welfare.When borrowing against
future resources is limited, however, the use of proportional payroll
tax finance for social security increases the incidence of liquidity
constraints on the consumption of individuals whose current resources
are low relative to their future resources.— 22—
Usingsimulation models under various assumptions about individual
preferences and technology, we analyze the impact of precautionary
saving against lifetime uncertainty and borrowing restrictions on
individual welfare and the capital stock in the presence and absence of
social security annuities. Our principal conclusions are four.First,
we find that precautionary saving exceeds life—cycle saving (that would
have taken place in the absence of lifetime uncertainty), lending
furthersupport to the notion that the perfect—certainty version of the
life—cyclemodel provides an inadequate explanation of observed saving
behavior. Second, the introduction of an actuarially fair social
security system leads to a significant partial equilibrium increase in
lifetime consumption and welfare, accompanied by a reduction in the
capital stock. The increase in Individual welfare is reduced, however,
and in some cases eliminated, when borrowing restrictions are imposed.
Third, extending the model to general equilibrium, we find that the
partial equilibrium gains in lifetime welfare from participation in
social security are offset by the interaction of higher steady—state
interest rates and binding liquidity constraints.Indeed, the steady—
state welfare cost of social security under proportional payroll tax
finance can be substantial. Finally, replacing the proportional payroll
tax with a progressive tax (essentially a linear tax with an exemption),
we show that age—specific tax schemes can restore much of the potential
gain from participating in social security.
This last finding suggests fruitful extensions of our research.
Since such schemes correspond cross—sectionally to progressive taxation,
the results cast doubt on recent claims of the inherent welfare costs
associated with progressive taxation. By modeling labor—supply— 23—
responsesto tax—induced changes in the net wage, more formal methods of
optimal taxation can be applied.
While we focus on the social security system, our approach should
be more generally applicable to examinations of fiscal policy in life—
cycle models.Social security provides an appropriate starting point
for analysis, since realizing the large potential welfare gains from the
insurance features of the system depends importantly on agents' ability
to smooth consumption over the life cycle.An obvious application of
the emphasis on precautionary saving is to types of uncertainty other
than that over longevity, and appropriate social insuranceprograms.In
addition, to the extent that liquidity constraints play an important
role, conclusions about the welfare effects of such policy reforms as
switching from progressive to proportional income taxation, changing the
tax base from income to consumption, or lowering taxes on capital income
while raising labor—income taxes will have to be reexamined.— 24—
Footnotes
'See for example the survey in Kotlikoff (1984).
2The focus of such analyses is generally on switching tax regimes, say
from a proportional general income tax to a proportional consumption or
wage tax.See for example Summers (1981), Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1983), Evans (1983), and Seidman (1984).Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and
Skinner (1983) have considered progressive taxation as well.
3Feldstein's results have by no means gone unchallenged;see for
example Barro (1974, 1978), Leimer and Lesnoy (1982), and the reply to
Leimer and Lesnoy in Feldstein (1982).Cross—sectional evidence has
been supportive of the proposition that social securIty has reduced
individual saving; see Feldsteln and Pellechio (1979), Kotlikoff
(1979b), Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1981), Diamond and Hausman (1984),
King and Dlcks—Mireaux (1982), and Hubbard (1983).
4See for example Sheshinski and Weiss (1981), Abel (1983), and Hubbard
(1984a,b).
5Additional evidence in support of the importance of liquidity
constraints in the U.S. is provided by Hayashi's (1985) study of data
from the 1963 Survey of Consumer Finances.Bernanke (1984) found no
evidence against the permanent income hypothesis in his examination of
expenditures on automobiles.Automobile loans are, however, self—
collateralized, while our discussion focuses primarily on non—
collateralized consumption loans.
6Distinguishing the extent to which intergenerational transfers
represent planned bequests is important for analyses of the effects of
government debt policy or social security policy on Individual
consumption.
7To illustrate the unimportance of non—pension annuities in the
U.S. ,only about one percent of households surveyed in the 1962 Survey
of Financial Characteristics held any annuities, with holdings of less
than 0.1 percent of household net worth for those who did (see
Projector and Weiss, 1966).
8The corresponding problem for the certain—lifetime case would be to
maximize
rD pt j U(C)edt, subject to A =w+rA—C
0
where D Is the expected date of death in (0,T) in the uncertain—
lifetime case.
9As In Davies (1981, p. 572), the lifetime path of mean noninvestment
income E Is approximated from ages 20 to 65 by a fourth—order
polynomial:
E(t) =36,999.4+ 3520.22t —101.878t2 + 1.34816 t3 —0.00706233t4.— 25—
Sincethe marginal loss due to a tighter liquidity constraint is
negligible if the constraint is light and greater when the constraint
is tight, losses due to the liquidity constraint are convex in the
tightness of the constaint. This indicates that the losses that arise
are underestimated by examining an average earnings pattern, since the
distribution of earnings patterns would include some with much tighter
constraints as well as some with looser constraints.
10 Our resultsin the absence of borrowing restrictions are
qualitatively robust to changes in p (p<r). We chose a rate of 1.5
percent, which we believe to be on the low side" of previous studies,
so astoavoid overemphasizing the effect ofthe liquidity
constraint. That is, higher values of p would increase desired
consumption in youth, magnifying the loss in welfare from the borrowing
restriction.
11The results reported are notvery sensitive to changes in the timing
of the receipt of the bequest after twenty periods.
12We chose a moderate payroll tax rate between the rate assessed at the
beginning of the system and the much higher rate in place now.The
results are not qualitatively sensitive to the choice of the payroll
tax rate.When the wealth nonnegativity constraint is introduced in
the next section, welfare losses from the interaction of the borrowing
constraint and the payroll tax increases with the tax rate in a
nonlinear fashion.
'3For example, Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) reportvery large welfare
gains from the introduction of a perfect annuity market.
140f course, the extent to which this benefit can be realized depends
on the extent to which borrowing constraints are binding when young.
As shown before, liquidity constraints can sharply reduce gains in
consumption due to social security even in a partial equilibrium model.
'5The model presented here assumes that labor is supplied inelastically
in all periods. A negative labor supply response to the higher payroll
tax would necessitate still higher taxes later in life.For a
discussion of the impact of social security on pre—retirement labor
supply, see Burkhausser and Turner (1978).— 26—
References
Abel,Andrew B. "Bequests with Uncertain Lifetimes."Mimeograph,
Harvard University, 1983.
Auerbach, Alan J. and Kotlikoff, Laurence J. "National Savings,
Economic Welfare, and the Structure of Taxation."In Martin Feldstein
(ed.). Behavioral Simulation Methods in Tax Policy Analysis.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
Auerbach, Alan J., Kotlikoff, Laurence 3., and Skinner, Jonathan. "The
Efficiency Gains from Dynamic Tax Reform." International Economic
Review 24 (February 1983): 81—100.
Barro, Robert J. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?"Journal of
Political Economy 82 (November/December 1974): 1095—1117.
Barro, Robert 3.The Impact of Social Security on Private Savings:
Evidence from the U. S. Time Series.Washington, D. C.:American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978.
Barro, Robert J. and Friedman, James W. "On Uncertain Lifetimes."
Journal of Political Economy 85 (August 1977): 843—849.
Bernanke, Ben S. "Permanent Income, Liquidity, and Expenditure on
Automobiles: Evidence from Panel Data." Quarterly Journal of Economics
99 (August 1984): 587—614.
Bernheim, B. Douglas, Schleifer, Andrei, and Summers, Lawrence H.
"Bequests as a Means of Payment."Working Paper No. 1303, National
Bureau of Economic Research, March 1984.
Blinder, Alan S., Gordon, Roger H., and Wise, Donald E. "Social
Security, Bequests, and the Life Cycle Theory of Saving: Cross—
Sectional Tests." Working Paper No. 619, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc., January 1981.
Burkhauser, Richard V. and Turner, John A."A Time—Series Analysis of
Social Security and Its Effect on the Market Work of Men at Younger
Ages." Journal of Political Economy 86 (August 1978): 701—715.
Davies, James. "Uncertain Lifetime, Consumption and Dissaving in
Retirement." Journal of Political Economy 89 (June 1981): 561—578.
Diamond, Peter A. and Hausman, Jerry A."Individual Retirement and
Savings Behavior."Journal of Public Economics 23 (February/March
1984): 81—114.
Eckstein, Zvi, Eichenbaum, Martin, and Peled, Dan. "Uncertain
Lifetimes and the Welfare—Enhancing Properties of Annuity Markets and
Social Security." Journal of Public Economics 26 (April 1985):
303—3 26.— 27—
Evans,Owen J."Tax Policy, the Interest Elasticity of Saving, and
Capital Accumulation: Numerical Analysis of Theoretical Models."
American Economic Review 73 (June 1983): 398—410.
Faber, J. F.Life Tables for the United States:1900—2050.U.S.
Department of HealthandHumanServices, Social Security
Administration, Actuarial Study No. 87, September 1982.
Farber,Henry S. "IndividualPreferencesandUnion Wage
Determination:The Case of the United Mine Workers."Journal of
Political Economy 86 (October 1978): 923—942.
Feldstein, Martin S. "Social Security, Induced Retirement and
Aggregate Capital Accumulation."Journal of Political Economy 82
(September! October 1974): 905—926.
_____________________________"Social Security and Private Saving:
Reply.Journal of Political Economy 90 (June 1982): 630—641.
Feldstein, Martin S. and Pellechio, Anthony."Social Security and
Household Wealth Accumulation: New Microeconomic Evidence."
Review of Economics and Statistics 61 (August 1979): 361—368.
Flavin, Marjorie. "Excess Sensitivity of Consumption to Current
Income:Liquidity Constraints or Myopia?" Working Paper No. 1341,
National Bureau of Economic Research, May 1984.
Friedman, Benjamin M. and Warshawsky, Mark. "Annuity Yields and Saving
in the United States." Mimeograph, Harvard University, February 1985.
Friend, Irwin and Blume, Marshall E."The Demand for Risky Assets."
American Economic Review 65 (December 1975): 900—922.
Hamermesh, Daniel S."Social Insurance and Consumption: An Empirical
Inquiry." American Economic Review 72 (March 1982): 101—113.
Hansen, Lars Peter and Singleton, Kenneth J."Stochastic Consumption,
Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior of Asset Returns."
Journal of Political Economy 91 (April 1983): 249—265.
Hayashi, Fumio. "The Effect of Liquidity Constraints on Consumption: A
Cross—Sectional Analysis." Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 (February
1985): 183—206.
Hayashi, Fumio. "The Permanent Income Hypothesis:Estimation and
Testing by Instrumental Variables."Journal of Political Economy 90
(October 1982): 895—918.
Hubbard, R. Glenn. The Financial Impacts of Social Security: A Study
of Effects on Household Wealth Accumulation and Allocation. Monograph
1983—3, Monograph Series in Finance and Economics, Salomon Brothers
Center for the Study of Financial Institutions, New York University,
1983.— 28—
_____________________(a)"'Precautionary' Saving Revisited:Social
Security individual Welfare, and the Capital Stock." Working Paper No.
1430, National Bureau of Economic Research, August 1984.
_________________(b)"Uncertain Lifetimes, Pensions, and Individual
Saving." Working Paper No. 1373, National Bureau of Economic Research,
April 1984;forthcoming in Zvi Bodie, John B. Shoven, and David A.
Wise (eds.), Issues in Pension Economics, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1985.
Judd, Kenneth L."Short—Run Analysis of Fiscal Policy in a Simple
Perfect Foresight Model." Journal of Political Economy 93 (April
1985): 298—319.
Kamien, Morton I. and Schwartz, Nancy L. Dynamic Optimization: The
Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control In Economics and Management.
New York: North Holland, 1982.
King, Mervyn A. and Dicks—Mireaux, Louis. "Asset Holdings and the Life
Cycle." Economic Journal 92 (June 1982): 247—267.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. "Social Security and Equilibrium Capital
Intensity." Quarterly Journal of Economics 94 (May 1979a): 233—253.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. "Taxation and Savings: A Neoclassical
Perspective." Journal of Economic Literature 22 (December 1984): 1576—
1629.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J."Testing the Theory of Social Security and Life
Cycle Accumulation."American Economic Review 69 (June 1979b): 396—
410.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J., Shoven, John B., and Spivak, Avia."Annuity
Markets, Saving, and the Capital Stock."Working Paper No. 1250,
National Bureau of Economic Research, December 1983.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. and Spivak, Avia. "The Family as an Incomplete
Annuities Market." Journal of Political Economy 89 (April 1981): 372—
391.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. and Summers, Lawrence H. "The Role of
Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation."
Journal of Political Economy 90 (August 1981): 706—732.
Leimer, Dean R. and Lesnoy, Selig D."Social Security and Private
Saving: New Time—Series Evidence."Journal of Political Economy 90
(June 1982): 606—629.
Projector, Dorothy S. and Weiss, Gertrude S. Survey of Financial
Characteristics of Consumers: Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, 1966.
Rothschild, Michael and StiglItz, Joseph. "Equilibrium In Competitive
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect— 29—
Information."Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (November 1976): 629—
650.
Seidman, Laurence S."Conversion to a Consumption Tax: The Transition
in a Life—Cycle Growth Model." Journal of Political Economy 92 (April
1984): 247—267.
Sheshlnski, Eytan and Weiss, Yoram."Uncertainty and Optimal Social
Security Systems. Quarterly Journal of Economics 96 (May 1981): 189—
206.
Summers, Lawrence H."Capital Taxation and Accumulation in a Life
Cycle Growth Model."American Economic Review 71 (September 1981):
533—544.
Yaarl, Menahem E. "Uncertain LIfetIme, LIfe Insurance, and the Theory of the
Consumer." Review of Economic Studies 32 (April 1965): 137—158.T
A
B
L
E
 
I
 
L
I
F
E
T
I
M
E
 
U
N
C
E
R
T
A
I
N
T
Y
,
 
T
H
E
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
S
T
O
C
K
,
 
A
N
I
)
 
B
E
Q
U
E
S
T
S
 
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
B
e
q
u
e
s
t
 
a
s
 
a
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
L
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
 
(
K
/
Y
)
 
(
K
/
Y
)
U
L
 
(
K
/
K
U
L
)
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
r
=
.
0
2
 
1
.
9
3
 
1
.
2
8
 
1
.
0
2
 
0
.
9
3
 
3
.
6
3
 
5
.
9
7
 
8
.
0
0
 
9
.
0
4
 
.
5
7
 
.
2
2
 
.
1
2
 
.
1
0
 
9
.
2
 
1
5
.
8
 
2
2
.
2
 
2
5
.
7
 
r
=
.
0
4
 
5
.
2
9
 
2
.
5
6
 
1
.
3
4
 
0
.
9
3
 
7
.
4
5
 
6
.
6
9
 
6
.
8
6
 
7
.
1
0
 
.
7
0
 
.
3
5
 
.
1
7
 
.
1
1
 
1
9
.
1
 
2
0
.
6
 
2
3
.
4
 
2
5
.
1
 
r
=
.
0
6
 
7
.
3
5
 
3
.
6
1
 
1
.
6
7
 
0
.
9
7
 
9
.
4
0
 
7
.
1
3
 
6
.
1
5
 
5
.
8
8
 
.
6
7
 
.
4
1
 
.
2
1
 
.
1
3
 
3
8
.
5
 
2
6
.
7
 
2
3
.
8
 
2
3
.
3
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
"
C
L
"
 
a
n
d
 
"
I
J
L
"
 
r
e
f
e
r
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
—
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
 
a
n
d
 
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
—
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
 
c
a
s
e
s
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
A
l
l
 
c
a
s
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
u
n
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
e
d
;
 
i
.
e
.
,
 
n
o
 
b
o
r
r
o
w
i
n
g
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
i
m
p
o
s
e
d
.
 N
o
t
e
:
 
A
 
i
s
 
e
x
p
r
e
s
s
e
d
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
.
 
P
e
r
i
o
d
s
 
C
o
n
a
t
 
r
a
i
n
e
d
 
T
A
B
L
E
 
2
 
L
I
Q
U
I
D
I
T
Y
 
C
O
N
S
T
R
A
I
N
T
S
,
 
T
H
E
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
S
T
O
C
K
,
 
A
M
)
 
I
M
)
I
V
L
D
U
A
L
 
W
E
L
F
A
R
E
 
(
C
E
R
T
A
I
N
—
L
I
F
E
T
I
M
E
 
C
A
S
E
)
 
U
n
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
e
d
 
C
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
e
d
 
8
 
8
 
8
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
r
=
.
0
2
 
9
 
1
0
 
1
0
 
1
1
 
1
.
9
3
 
1
.
2
8
 
1
.
0
2
 
0
.
9
3
 
3
.
0
9
 
2
.
7
1
 
2
.
5
6
 
2
.
5
2
 
—
1
.
8
 
—
6
.
4
 
—
2
0
.
5
 
—
3
5
.
2
 
r
.
O
4
 
6
 
8
 
1
0
 
1
1
 
5
.
2
9
 
2
.
5
6
 
1
.
3
4
 
0
.
9
3
 
5
.
5
3
 
3
.
4
4
 
2
.
6
9
 
2
.
4
6
 
—
0
.
3
 
—
4
.
6
 
—
2
0
.
0
 
—
3
5
.
4
 
r
=
.
0
6
 
2
 
6
 
9
 
1
0
 
7
.
3
5
 
3
.
6
1
 
1
.
6
7
 
0
.
9
7
 
7
.
3
7
 
4
.
1
3
 
2
.
8
2
 
2
.
4
2
 
—
0
.
1
 
—
3
.
4
 
—
1
9
.
3
 
—
3
4
.
8
 T
A
B
L
E
 
3
 
L
I
Q
U
I
D
I
T
Y
 
C
O
N
S
T
R
A
I
N
T
S
,
 
T
H
E
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
S
T
O
C
K
,
 
A
N
D
 
I
M
)
I
V
I
D
U
A
L
 
W
E
L
F
A
R
E
 
(
U
N
C
E
R
T
A
I
N
—
L
I
F
E
T
I
M
E
 
C
A
S
E
)
 
K
/
V
 
P
e
 
n
o
d
s
 
C
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
e
d
 
8
 
I
J
n
c
o
n
s
 
t
r
a
l
 
n
e
d
 
C
o
n
s
 
t
r
a
i
n
e
d
 
r
=
.
0
2
 
9
 
8
 
7
 
7
 
3
.
6
3
 
5
.
9
7
 
8
.
0
0
 
9
.
0
4
 
4
.
8
6
 
7
.
1
1
 
9
.
0
1
 
9
.
9
9
 
—
3
.
6
 
—
7
.
2
 
—
1
6
.
1
 
—
2
6
.
5
 
r
=
.
0
4
 
4
 
7
 
8
 
8
 
7
.
4
5
 
6
.
6
9
 
6
.
8
6
 
7
.
1
0
 
7
.
7
0
 
7
.
3
7
 
7
.
1
9
 
8
.
1
1
 
—
0
.
9
 
—
5
.
4
 
—
1
8
.
1
 
—
3
1
.
5
 
r
=
.
0
6
 
2
 
5
 
8
 
9
 
9
.
4
0
 
7
.
1
3
 
6
.
1
5
 
5
.
8
8
 
9
.
4
2
 
7
.
4
9
 
6
.
9
4
 
6
.
8
6
 
—
0
.
1
 
—
4
.
0
 
—
1
8
.
7
 
—
3
3
.
3
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
i
s
 
e
x
p
r
e
s
s
e
d
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
.
 T
A
B
L
E
 
4
 
C
O
N
T
R
I
B
U
T
I
O
N
S
 
O
F
 
L
I
F
E
T
I
M
E
 
U
N
C
E
R
T
A
I
N
T
Y
 
A
N
D
 
B
O
R
R
O
W
I
N
G
 
R
E
S
T
R
I
C
T
I
O
N
S
 
T
O
 
T
H
E
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
S
T
O
C
K
 
(
K
C
L
,
N
C
/
K
C
L
 
,
)
 
(
K
c
L
,
c
/
1
(
u
L
 
(
K
c
L
,
N
c
/
K
U
L
c
)
 
8
 
B
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
r
=
.
0
2
 
.
6
1
 
.
4
6
 
.
3
9
 
.
3
6
 
.
6
8
 
.
3
8
 
.
2
7
 
.
2
4
 
.
4
1
 
.
1
8
 
.
1
0
 
.
0
8
 
r
.
O
4
 
.
9
5
 
.
7
1
 
.
4
7
 
.
3
6
 
.
1
1
 
.
4
2
 
.
3
0
 
.
2
5
 
.
6
7
 
.
3
0
 
.
1
4
 
.
0
9
 
r
=
.
0
6
 
.
9
9
 
.
8
4
 
.
5
5
 
.
3
6
 
.
6
7
 
.
4
5
 
.
3
2
 
.
2
7
 
.
6
7
 
.
3
7
 
.
1
7
 
.
1
0
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
C
L
W
 
a
n
d
 
"
i
l
L
"
 
r
e
f
e
r
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
—
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
 
a
n
d
 
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
—
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
 
c
a
s
e
s
,
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
 
"
N
C
'
 
a
n
d
 
"
C
"
 
r
e
f
e
r
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
a
b
s
e
n
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
b
o
r
r
o
w
i
n
g
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
t
s
.
 T
A
B
L
E
 
5
 
S
O
C
I
A
L
 
S
E
C
U
R
I
T
Y
,
 
T
H
E
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
S
T
O
C
K
 
A
N
D
 
I
N
D
I
V
I
D
U
A
L
 
W
E
L
f
A
R
E
 
(
N
o
 
L
I
Q
U
I
D
I
T
Y
 
C
O
N
S
T
R
A
I
N
T
S
)
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
B
e
q
u
e
s
t
s
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
K
/
Y
 
a
s
 
a
 
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
L
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
A
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
r
=
.
0
2
 
—
4
8
.
2
 
—
5
8
.
1
 
—
5
8
.
9
 
—
5
7
.
9
 
—
8
8
.
0
 
—
8
3
.
5
 
—
7
9
.
3
 
—
7
6
.
7
 
4
.
4
 
8
.
2
 
1
1
.
1
 
1
2
.
6
 
r
=
.
O
4
 
—
2
7
.
7
 
—
5
0
.
4
 
—
6
5
.
2
 
—
7
0
.
1
 
—
8
0
.
1
 
—
9
4
.
2
 
—
9
8
.
3
 
—
9
8
.
8
 
5
.
4
 
6
.
6
 
7
.
7
 
8
.
1
 
r
=
.
0
6
 
—
1
7
.
0
 
—
3
2
.
0
 
—
3
6
.
5
 
—
3
9
.
3
 
—
7
3
.
8
 
—
9
5
.
5
 
—
9
7
.
5
 
—
9
8
.
3
 
6
.
1
 
3
.
8
 
1
.
9
 
1
.
3
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
A
 
i
s
 
e
x
p
r
e
s
s
e
d
 
a
s
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
.
 
A
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
K
/
Y
 
a
r
e
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
 
n
o
—
s
o
c
i
a
l
—
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
c
a
s
e
s
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
 
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
.
 T
A
B
L
E
 
6
 
L
I
Q
U
I
D
I
T
Y
 
C
O
N
S
T
R
A
I
N
T
S
 
A
N
D
 
S
O
C
I
A
L
 
S
E
C
U
R
I
T
Y
:
 
T
H
E
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
S
T
O
C
K
 
A
N
D
 
I
N
D
I
V
I
D
U
A
L
 
W
E
L
F
A
R
E
 
P
e
r
i
o
d
s
 
C
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
e
d
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
K
/
Y
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
B
e
q
u
e
s
t
s
 
a
s
 
a
 
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
L
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
 
8
 
8
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
—
.
9
 
—
2
 
—
4
 
—
6
 
t
 
.
O
6
 
8
 
r
=
.
0
2
 
1
3
 
1
2
 
1
1
 
1
0
 
—
2
9
.
4
 
—
3
9
.
2
 
—
4
2
.
4
 
—
4
2
.
7
 
—
8
2
.
1
 
—
7
7
.
1
 
—
1
2
.
9
 
—
7
0
.
2
 
3
.
5
 
4
.
5
 
0
.
1
 
—
4
.
3
 
r
=
.
0
4
 
5
 
9
 
1
2
 
1
3
 
—
2
4
.
5
 
—
3
9
.
0
 
—
4
7
.
8
 
—
5
1
.
4
 
—
7
8
.
6
 
—
8
9
.
5
 
—
9
3
.
3
 
—
9
4
.
5
 
5
.
0
 
3
.
9
 
—
1
.
8
 
—
5
.
2
 
r
=
.
0
6
 
2
 
7
 
1
1
 
1
2
 
—
1
6
.
7
 
—
2
9
.
1
 
—
3
1
.
4
 
—
3
2
.
8
 
—
7
3
.
6
 
—
9
3
.
6
 
—
9
5
.
8
 
—
9
6
.
6
 
5
.
9
 
2
.
4
 
—
3
.
5
 
—
5
.
6
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
I
t
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
K
/
Y
 
a
r
e
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
 
n
o
—
s
o
c
i
a
l
—
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
c
a
s
e
s
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
 
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
.
 T
A
B
L
E
 
7
 
G
E
N
E
R
A
L
 
E
Q
U
I
L
I
B
R
I
U
M
 
E
F
F
E
C
T
S
 
O
F
 
S
O
C
I
A
L
 
S
E
C
U
R
I
T
Y
 
O
N
 
T
H
E
 
C
A
P
I
T
A
L
 
S
T
O
C
K
 
A
N
D
 
I
N
D
I
V
I
D
U
A
L
 
W
E
L
F
A
R
E
*
 
I
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
(
F
i
x
e
d
 
r
,
 
o
f
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
B
e
q
u
e
s
t
 
A
d
j
u
s
t
s
)
 
I
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
(
N
e
w
 
S
t
e
a
d
y
 
S
t
a
t
e
)
 
*
 
I
n
 
a
l
l
 
c
a
s
e
s
,
 
P
=
O
.
0
1
5
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
8
0
.
0
6
.
 
A
 
i
s
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
n
o
—
s
o
c
i
a
l
—
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
s
t
e
a
d
y
 
s
t
a
t
e
.
 
b
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
b
e
q
u
e
s
t
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
L
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
 
e
v
e
n
i
n
g
s
.
 
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
S
t
e
a
d
y
 
S
t
a
t
e
 
r
 
K
/
Y
 
b
 
A
 
I
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
(
F
i
x
e
d
 
r
,
 
F
i
x
e
d
 
B
e
q
u
e
s
t
)
 
r
 
K
/
Y
 
b
 
.
€
1
3
5
 
8
.
5
1
 
2
1
.
1
%
 
.
0
3
5
 
6
.
8
6
 
6
.
9
%
 
+
3
.
8
%
 
.
0
3
1
 
9
.
6
2
 
2
6
.
9
 
.
0
3
1
 
7
.
7
9
 
1
0
.
2
 
+
0
.
3
 
.
0
2
4
 
1
2
.
4
8
 
3
5
.
8
 
.
0
2
4
 
1
0
.
1
8
 
1
7
.
8
 
—
4
.
5
 
.
0
2
0
 
1
4
.
6
6
 
4
2
.
1
 
.
0
2
0
 
1
2
.
2
3
 
2
4
.
3
 
—
4
.
9
 
r
 
K
/
Y
 
b
 
A
 
8
=
—
.
9
 
.
0
3
5
 
5
.
5
1
 
4
.
1
%
 
—
8
.
2
%
 
.
0
4
4
 
6
.
7
4
 
3
.
5
%
 
—
1
4
.
7
%
 
B
=
—
2
 
.
0
3
1
 
4
.
7
8
 
3
.
8
 
—
9
.
0
 
.
0
5
8
 
5
.
2
2
 
1
.
8
 
—
2
7
.
9
 
B
=
—
4
 
.
0
2
4
 
5
.
9
0
 
7
.
6
 
—
6
.
9
 
.
0
6
1
 
4
.
8
7
 
1
.
1
 
—
3
7
.
2
 
8
=
—
6
 
.
0
2
0
 
7
.
3
4
 
1
1
.
7
 
—
7
.
4
 
.
0
6
3
 
4
.
7
8
 
1
.
0
 
—
4
1
.
8
 
r
 
K
/
I
 
b
 
A
 T
A
B
L
E
 
8
 
P
R
O
G
R
E
S
S
I
V
E
 
T
A
X
A
T
I
O
N
 
A
N
D
 
S
O
C
I
A
L
 
S
E
C
U
R
I
T
Y
:
 
R
E
A
S
S
E
S
S
I
N
G
 
T
H
E
 
I
M
P
A
C
T
 
O
N
 
I
N
D
I
V
I
D
U
A
L
 
W
E
L
F
A
R
E
 
_
_
_
_
_
 
f
3
=
—
4
 
r
 
=
 
.
0
2
 
4
.
2
%
 
6
.
3
%
 
4
.
3
%
 
1
.
4
%
 
(
3
.
5
)
 
(
4
.
5
)
 
(
0
.
1
)
 
(
—
4
.
3
)
 
r
 
=
 
.
0
4
 
5
.
1
 
5
.
3
 
2
.
7
 
0
.
6
 
(
5
.
0
)
 
(
3
.
9
)
 
(
—
1
.
8
)
 
(
—
5
.
2
)
 
r
 
=
 
.
0
6
 
6
.
0
 
4
.
0
 
0
.
8
 
0
.
2
 
(
5
.
9
)
 
(
2
.
4
)
 
(
—
3
.
5
)
 
(
—
5
.
6
)
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
L
 
i
s
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
 
n
o
—
s
o
c
i
a
l
—
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
c
a
s
e
s
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
l
i
f
e
t
i
m
e
 
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
b
o
r
r
o
w
i
n
g
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
m
p
o
s
e
d
.
 
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
 
a
r
e
 
e
x
e
m
p
t
 
f
r
o
m
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
t
a
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
f
i
f
t
e
e
n
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
.
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
s
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
w
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
g
a
i
n
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
i
m
p
o
s
i
n
g
 
a
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
o
f
 
i
d
e
n
t
i
c
a
l
 
s
i
z
e
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
 
p
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
p
a
y
r
o
l
l
 
t
a
x
.
 